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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
On appeal, Mr. Whitaker asserted that the district court erred when it concluded 
that certain evidence was not prior act evidence under Idaho Rule of Evidence 404(b), 
and when it admitted that evidence despite the State's failure to provide the required 
pre-trial notice. Mr. Whitaker also asserted that unobjected to prosecutorial misconduct 
during closing arguments constituted fundamental error. 
In its Respondent's Brief, the State acknowledges that the objected to evidence 
was prior act evidence. (Respondent's Brief, pp.6-7.) However, the State argues that it 
was properly admitted without a 404(b) analysis because it was intrinsic to the crimes 
charged. In the alternative, the State argues that, although the district court did not 
conduct a 404(b) analysis, it conducted an equivalent analysis, that, even though no 
404(b) notice was provided, the State provided equivalent notice by disclosing its intent 
to use different evidence than what was objected to, or, that even if the district court did 
err, any error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. (Respondent's Brief, pp.7-14.) 
As to Mr. Whitaker's second argument, the State disputes that he established any of the 
three prongs necessary to establish fundamental error, let alone all three. 
(Respondent's Brief, pp.15-23.) 
This Reply Brief is necessary to address and rebut the State's arguments against 
Mr. Whitaker's 404(b) claims. Although Mr. Whitaker continues to maintain that the 
unobjected to prosecutorial misconduct constituted fundamental error, he will rely on the 
arguments set forth in his Appellant's Brief, and will not reiterate those herein. 
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Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated 
in Mr. Whitaker's Appellant's Brief. They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief, but 
are incorporated herein by reference. 
2 
ISSUES 
1. Was the testimony of Mr. Whitaker's wife - that she witnessed him watching 
adult pornography - intrinsic to the crimes charged? 
2. Did the district court conduct an analysis that was equivalent to a 404(b) 
analysis? 
3. Did the State satisfy the notice requirement of 404(b)? 
4. Has the State met its burden to establish that any error in admitting the 404(b) 




The Testimony Of Mr. Whitaker's Wife - That She Witnessed Him Watching Adult 
Pornography- Was Not Intrinsic To The Crimes Charged 
In its Respondent's Brief, the State argues that the evidence - consisting of the 
testimony of Mr. Whitaker's wife that she saw him watch adult pornography - was 
intrinsic to the crimes charged. (Respondent's Brief, pp.7-9.) Specifically, the State 
contends, 
I.R.E. 404(b) "does not extend to evidence of acts which are intrinsic to 
the charged offense. State v. Sheldon, 145 Idaho 225, 228, 178 P.3d 28, 
31 (2008). In Sheldon, the Idaho Supreme Court stated that "[e]vidence of 
an act is intrinsic when it and evidence of the crime charged are 
inextricably intertwined, or both acts are part of a single criminal episode, 
or it was a necessary preliminary to the crime charged." Id.; See also 
State v. Avila, 137 Idaho 410, 413, 49 P.3d 1260, 1263 (Ct. App. 2002) 
("The Idaho appellate courts have held that I.R.E. 404(b) does not prevent 
the introduction of other misconduct evidence if the misconduct was so 
interconnected with the charged offense that a complete account of the 
charged offense could not be given to the jury without disclosure of the 
uncharged misconduct.") (citing State v. Izatt, 96 Idaho 667, 670, 534 P.2d 
1107, 1110 (1975)[)]; State v. Blackstead, 126 Idaho 14, 17-18, 878 P.2d 
188, 191-192 (Ct. App. 1994)). 
Evidence that Whitaker had possession of and access to pornography on 
his computer was both inextricably intertwined with the four charged 
crimes of exposing his step-daughters to pornography, and a necessary 
preliminary to those charges. It was therefore not subject to I.R.E. 404(b) 
analysis. 
(Respondent's Brief, p.8 (bracketed "e" in original; bracketed ")" added.) 
The State's reliance on Sheldon, Avila, and Blackstead is misplaced. First, the 
quote attributed to the Idaho Supreme Court is actually from a portion of Sheldon that 
quotes comments to the Federal Rules of Evidence provided by the State in its 
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argument1; it is not a direct quote from, or about, I.R.E. 404(b). See Sheldon, 145 Idaho 
at 228. 
In Sheldon, the Court held that the disputed evidence - "a large amount of cash" 
which was discovered along with a large quantity of methamphetamine in a car that 
Sheldon was driving - was not 404(b) evidence because it was not a prior crime, wrong, 
or other act. The Court noted that both sides presented testimony as to the significance 
(or lack of significance) of the large amount of cash, with the State arguing that it was 
circumstantial evidence of drug trafficking and Sheldon testifying that some of the cash 
represented the proceeds of a loan and that the rest came from the sale of a 
motorcycle. Ultimately, the Court concluded that "the jury was permitted to weight each 
side's testimony and reach a conclusion about which party was credible." Id. Unlike the 
facts in Sheldon, instances of Mr. Whitaker's viewing of pornography by himself or in the 
presence of his wife was not inextricably connected to the charged crimes, nor did 
Mr. Whitaker testify as to the disputed evidence. 
Avila and Blackstead can also be easily distinguished. In Avila, the issue was 
whether the minor victim's testimony that, while Avila was fondling her, he told her about 
a recent experience at a strip club that involved fondling a stripper was irrelevant 404(b) 
evidence. 2 The portion of the opinion quoted by the State, that 404(b) does not 
preclude the admission of other acts evidence if it is "so interconnected with the 
1 "The State argues the cash discovered in the vehicle was 'part and parcel' of the crime 
of possession. Given the lack of Idaho authority on point, the State points to federal 
authority. The comments to the 1991 amendments to Fed. R. Evid. 404(b) state the 
notice requirement 'does not extend to evidence of acts which are "intrinsic" to the 
charged offense."' Sheldon, 145 Idaho at 228 (emphasis added). 
2 The notice issue was not raised in Avila. 
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charged offense that complete account of the charged offense could not be given to the 
jury without disclosure of the uncharged misconduct[.]" is immediately followed with the 
Court's reasoning that, 
Avila's story about his strip club experience occurred simultaneously with 
the charged offense, and introduction of evidence about it was necessary 
to present the jury with the entire context in which the alleged touching of 
A.A. 's back and breast occurred. 
Avila, 137 Idaho at 413-14. Similarly, in 8/ackstead, the Idaho Court of Appeals 
concluded that "the alleged drug use by Blackstead and the victim shortly before the 
sexual molestation and his gift of marijuana to her immediately thereafter were 
inextricably connected with the charged sexual offense." 8/ackstead, 126 Idaho at 18. 
In Mr. Whitaker's case, none of the allegations of wrongdoing concerning 
pornography involves Mr. Whitaker watching pornography around his wife or that he 
discussed such events while showing the victims pornography. Such evidence, then, is 
not "so interconnected ... that a complete account of the charged offense could not be 
given" without relating it to the jury. The State's argument that the evidence was 
"intrinsic" to the crimes charged is, therefore, without merit. 
11. 
The District Court Did Not Conduct An Analysis That Was The Equivalent Of A 404(b) 
Analysis 
While acknowledging that the district court erred when it held that the evidence in 
dispute was not a prior act subject to 404(b) analysis, the State argues, 
the state still did argue, and the district court still did recognize, that the 
evidence was relevant for purposes beyond criminal propensity. (Tr., 
p.87, L.25 - p.94, L.25.) In further concluding that the probative value of 
the evidence was substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair 
prejudice pursuant to I.R.E. 403, the district court ultimately conducted an 
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analysis that satisfied the requirements of admission pursuant to I.R.E. 
404(b). (Id.) Thus, the district court did not ultimately err in admitting the 
evidence. 
(Respondent's Brief, pp.9-10.) 
The State's argument is problematic for two reasons. First, the State cited to no 
authority to support its argument that a non-404(b) analysis can serve as a substitute for 
the required 404(b) analysis. As such, the State's argument must be rejected under 
State v. Zichko, 129 Idaho 259, 263 (1996) ("A party waives an issue cited on appeal if 
either authority or argument is lacking"). Second, the State's claim that the record 
shows that "the state did argue, and the district court still did recognize, that the 
evidence was relevant for purposes beyond propensity" is not supported by its generic 
citation to seven pages of the trial transcript. As the State failed to pinpoint specific 
passages within those transcript pages, it is important to examine their content in detail. 
The transcript pages cited by the State reflect that the State made the following 
argument: 
Your Honor, this line .of questioning, by the fact that the defendant has 
plead[ed] not guilty has stated that he has not shown the girls 
pornography. The state needs to be able to show to the jury that he did 
have access to pornography and the fact that he was able to watch it and 
that that pornography would be watched on a computer, which is what the 
juveniles would state they were shown the pornography on, so we believe 
it's relevant in laying the foundation that there was pornography in the 
home and it was on his computer. 
It's not being used to show that he's done something wrong because, one 
wriile watching adult pornography does not necessarily make you a bad 
person, nor is it illegal. But, as the testimony from Melissa Rowe 
indicates, he indicated he was not savvy enough to know how to have a 
history, and yet the girls are going to say that they saw it on his computer. 
So this is simply corroborating and used to show that it wasn't a lack of 
accident [sic] that the porn just popped up while they were watching a 
[non-pornographic] movie. 
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We do not believe it's 404(b). We do not think it's a prior bad act, but we 
do believe we need to establish that porn had been in that house and had 
been on that computer. 
(Tr., p.90, L.10 - p.91, L.9.) 
The district court, explaining its take on the issue and articulating its ruling, said: 
One of the difficulties that we have in this trial is that I don't know how this 
evidence is going to develop. There is nothing to corroborate at this point 
because there has been no testimony as to by what counsel represents 
will be testified to by the children. 
Assuming for purposes of my ruling that there is some basis for 
corroboration, certainly this evidence is relevant in this case. It's relevant 
for lots of reasons, but among other things, to show the simple existence 
of those materials. 
3 
The court is going to rule that this is not 404(b) evidence. The reason for 
that is that it's not illegal to have adult pornography. I don't think that fits 
the definition of a crime or wrong or an act as that is deemed, as that is 
used within 404. 
With regard to the 403 issue, the standard the court is required to apply is, 
first, to determine whether it's relevant. I do determine that the answer to 
this question is relevant. The corroboration or the anticipated 
corroboration, if you will, from this witness that Mr. Whitaker possessed 
pornography would certainly support the claim that the child viewed the 
pornography that was in Mr. Whitaker's possession. I'm a little hesitant to 
let this evidence come in at this point because again we don't have that 
foundation, but I'm going to take Ms. Sturgill's representation that it's 
going to come in and so I'm going to find that it's relevant. 
Second, I have to determine is there some validity to the belief that such 
evidence does exist here? And again, depending on what this witness's 
answer is going to be, I think I have to find that. 
Then the question is, is there unfair prejudice? Well as the rule says, 
whether the probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of 
3 This ellipse indicates an omission of a brief discussion with the State as to whether the 
pornography about which the witness was going to testify was child pornography. The 
State assured the district court that "[i]t's always been adult porn and she will testify to 
nothing but adult porn." (Tr., p.92, L.19 - p.93, L.8.) 
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unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues or misleading the jury or by 
considerations of undue delay, waste of time or needless presentation of 
cumulative evidence. The court finds that that is not applicable in this 
case, assuming that we are talking a very narrow timeframe here, 4 
particularly having this witness testify that there was pornography in 
Mr. Whitaker's control here in Twin Falls as opposed to some earlier time. 
(Tr., p.92, L.8 - p.94, L.16 (emphasis added).) 
As can be seen from a review of the quoted portions of the transcript, nowhere 
was the term "propensity" used by either the State or the district court. In fact, the State 
argued that the evidence was not prior act evidence, and did not represent evidence 
that Mr. Whitaker had done anything wrong under Rule 404(b). (Tr., p.90, Ls.21-24.) 
Second, in explaining why it believed that the evidence was relevant, the district 
court appears to have acknowledged that the evidence did show a propensity, 
specifically stating that the proffered testimony "that Mr. Whitaker possessed 
pornography would certainly support the claim that the child viewed the pornography 
that was in Mr. Whitaker's possession." (Tr., p.93, Ls.17-21.) This conclusion is exactly 
what the Idaho Supreme Court warned about in State v. Grist, 147 Idaho 49 (2009), 
when it cautioned against trial courts "permit[ting] the introduction of impermissible 
propensity evidence merely by relabeling it as 'corroborative' or as evidence of a 
'common scheme or plan."' Id., 147 Idaho at 53-54. 
The Court concluded its opinion in Grist by warning that, 
The trial courts of this state must carefully scrutinize evidence offered 
under I.R.E. 404(b) for purposes of "corroboration" as demonstrating a 
"common scheme or plan" in order to determine whether such evidence 
actually serves the articulated purpose or whether such evidence is 
merely propensity evidence served up under a different name. 
4 That "very narrow timeframe" turned out to be between "the end of 2007 up until 2009." 
(Tr., p.96, Ls.2-5.) 
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Id., 147 Idaho at 55 (emphasis added). Obviously, in Mr. Whitaker's case, neither the 
State nor the district court believed that the evidence represented prior act evidence 
necessitating a 404(b) analysis. As such, it is not possible to conclude that the district 
court "carefully scrutinized evidence offered under I.R.E. 404(b)[,]" let alone that its 
general relevance analysis under Rule 403 otherwise satisfied the strictures of Rule 
404(b). 
111. 
The State Did Not Satisfy The Notice Requirement Of 404(b) 
In its Respondent's Brief, the State acknowledges that it did not provide formal 
notice under Rule 404(b) of its intent to offer evidence of other acts. (Respondent's 
Brief, pp.11-12.) However, it argues that the failure to provide such formal notice need 
not be fata I because, 
Whitaker was aware, from the victims' preliminary hearing testimony, and 
likely the discovery materials provided to him prior to trial, that the state 
was alleging that Whitaker had shown his step-daughters pornography 
contained on his own computers. (Prelim Tr., p.7 4, L.13 - p. 76, L.23; 
p.88, L.15 - p.92, L.12.) While the Idaho Supreme Court has held that 
compliance with the I.R.E. 404(b) notice requirements is mandatory and a 
condition precedent to admission of "other acts" evidence (State v. 
Sheldon, 145 Idaho 225, 178 P.3d 28 (2008)), it has not expressly 
required such notice be specifically provided as formal "I.R.E. 404(b) 
notice." Unlike in the present case, there was no indication that Sheldon 
was necessarily aware that the state intended to introduce evidence of 
Sheldon's prior bad acts5 (past involvement in methamphetamine 
trafficking). 
5 Appellate counsel is troubled by the State's attempt to distinguish precedent based on 
non-existent factual "differences." Specifically, the State does not assert that the facts 
of Sheldon demonstrate that Sheldon was never made aware of the prior acts evidence 
that the State sought to introduce without notice, rather, without citing to any portion of 
Sheldon, it merely asserts that "there was no indication that Sheldon was necessarily 
aware that the state intended to introduce evidence of Sheldon's prior bad acts[.]" 
(Respondent's Brief, p.12 (emphasis added).) 
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(Respondent's Brief, pp.11-12 (emphasis added).) 
The State's analysis is flawed in several respects. First, the State's assertion 
that it was "likely" that Mr. Whitaker received notice through discovery materials is 
unsupported by a citation to the record. The State simply asserts it as "likely" to be a 
fact despite the record being devoid of a copy of the discovery materials that were 
provided to defense counsel by the State. This violates Idaho Appellate Rule 35(b)(6), 
which requires that the argument portion of the respondent's brief contain "the 
contentions of the respondent ... with citations to the ... parts of the transcript and 
record relied upon." I.AR. 35(b)(6). 
Second, nowhere in its Respondent's Brief does the State contend that 
Mr. Whitaker was provided notice of the testimony that his wife provided - and to which 
he objected on 404(b) grounds - that he had watched pornography on his computer in 
her presence between 2007 and 2009. The fact that he was charged with showing 
pornography to his stepdaughters, or that they testified to that fact at the preliminary 
hearing, is not the same as showing that he received notice of the anticipated testimony 
of his wife concerning 404(b) other acts. 
Third, the State's argument that the Idaho Supreme Court has "not expressly 
required such notice be specifically provided as formal 'I.R.E. 404(b) notice'" is 
unsupported by a review of the plain language of the rule or of the Court's decision in 
Appellate counsel asserts that it is just as likely that Sheldon was aware of the prior acts 
evidence before the State attempted, without notice, to introduce it. Sheldon, 145 Idaho 
at 227 ("the State never notified Sheldon of its intent to produce any evidence of other 
bad acts pursuant to I.R.E. 404(b). At the beginning of trial, Sheldon's counsel orally 
moved to exclude any such evidence based on the State's failure to file and serve 
notice of its intent to use such evidence.") (emphasis added). 
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Sheldon. Rule 404(b), in relevant part, provides that evidence of prior acts "may ... be 
admissible ... provided that the prosecution in a criminal case sha// file and serve 
notice reasonably in advance of trial[.]" I.R.E. 404(b) (emphasis added). The State's 
attempt to rewrite the notice requirement of Rule 404(b) would render the language 
"shall file and serve notice" mere surplusage and ignores the plain language of the rule. 
With respect to Sheldon, the Idaho Supreme Court specifically held "that 
compliance with I.RE. 404(b) is mandatory and a condition precedent to admission of 
other acts evidence. Because the State failed to comply with the notice provisions of 
I.R.E. 404(b}, Sheldon's statements were inadmissible." Id., 145 Idaho at 230 
(emphasis added). Nowhere in the quoted language does the Court indicate that 
anything other than the specific notice requirement of 404(b) is acceptable to satisfy the 
404(b)'s condition precedent. The fact that the Court refers to "the notice provisions" 
and describes the requirement as a "condition precedent" provides strong evidence that 
there is no such thing as non-"formal" 404(b) notice. 
The State has failed to establish that it provided the required notice that is the 
condition precedent for admission of Rule 404(b) evidence, and, as such, this Court 
should find that admission of the 404(b) evidence was erroneous. 
IV. 
The State Has Failed To Establish That The Erroneous Admission Of 404(b) Evidence 
Was Harmless Beyond A Reasonable Doubt 
In order to avoid a reversal after a defendant has established that objected to 
error occurred at trial, the State must satisfy the Chapman6 test and prove "that the error 
6 Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967). 
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is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt." State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 222 (2010). In 
its Respondent's Brief, the State argues that, assuming that the district court's 
admission of the evidence was erroneous, that the error was nonetheless harmless 
beyond a reasonable doubt because it "was brief and devoid of prejudicial or explicit 
detail" especially in light of the evidence at trial that he had "exposed his step-children to 
pornography on multiple occasions[,]" and that "a risk assessment worker for State of 
Idaho Child Protection had already testified that Whitaker had told her he had previously 
had pornography on his computer." (Respondent's Brief, p.13.) 
This argument flies in the face of the State's argument before the district court 
that the evidence at issue was important because "[t]he state needs to be able to show 
to the jury that he did have access to pornography and the fact that he was able to 
watch it and that that pornography would be watched on a computer." (Tr., p.90, Ls.13-
20.) The State also argued that it represented corroborating evidence, and that "we 
need to establish that porn had been in that house and had been on that computer." 
(Tr., p.91, Ls.2-9.) After successfully obtaining admission of the evidence by arguing its 
importance to its case, it is disingenuous at best for the State to argue on appeal that 
the evidence was essentially unimportant. This Court should reject the State's attempt 
to eat its cake and have it, too. 
The State next argues that the evidence couldn't have come as a surprise (and 
thereby been prejudicial to Mr. Whitaker's defense strategy) because the existence of 
other evidence about pornography was known to Mr. Whitaker through the charging 
document and the testimony of the victims at the preliminary hearing. (Respondent's 
Brief, pp.13-14.) What the State fails to establish, however, is why the fact that 
13 
Mr. Whitaker was informed about other admissible evidence concerning pornography 
somehow eliminates any prejudice resulting from its failure to disclose the actual 
evidence that was erroneously admitted over his objection. 
Finally, the State argues, that in light of the jury's having found him guilty of 
"fourteen felony sex offenses[,]" 
It is true beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury's credibility determination 
about the victims' extensive testimony was not entirely dependent upon 
evidence that Whitaker's wife had observed him watching legal, adult 
pornography on his own home computer. 
(Respondent's Brief, p.14.) 
It is difficult to understand how an argument that a jury verdict "was not entirely 
dependent" upon the erroneously admitted evidence somehow supports an argument 
that the admission of such evidence was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The 
implication of the State's argument is that the jury's credibility determination was 
somewhat, though not entirely, dependent upon the erroneously admitted evidence. 
Furthermore, the State fails to acknowledge that the jury found him not guilty of one 
count of lewd conduct and one count of sexual abuse (for purportedly showing 
pornography to one of the victims). (R., pp.183, 185.) The fact that Mr. Whitaker was 
acquitted of some of the counts indicates that this was not a slam-dunk case, and that 
the credibility of the victims was an issue of concern to the jurors. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth in this Reply Brief and in his Appellant's Brief, 
Mr. Whitaker respectfully requests that t~lis Court vacate the judgment of conviction and 
remand his case to the district court for a new trial on the fourteen charges upon which 
he was convicted. 
DATED this 13th day of October, 2011. 
State Appellate Public Defender 
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